Ownership in cross-border acquisitions and entry timing of the target firm by Fuentelsaz, Lucio et al.
OWNERSHIP IN CROSS-BORDER ACQUISITIONS   
AND ENTRY TIMING OF THE TARGET FIRM1 
Lucio Fuentelsaz 
Universidad de Zaragoza 




Universidad de Zaragoza 




Universidad de Zaragoza 






We examine how the entry timing of targets influences the initial and the post-entry 
percentage of ownership acquired by multinationals. We argue that targets that have 
entered earlier into the market launch signals of lower uncertainty in contexts where 
first-mover advantages exist. As a consequence, multinationals are willing to buy higher 
levels of ownership in these early entrant targets and to increase their participation in 
the subsidiary equity in the post-entry stage. Finding support for these relationships, we 
study how market age and innovative behaviour of the target reduce the importance of 
leading time as determinant of the ownership decision. 
 
Keywords: cross-border acquisitions, initial ownership, ownership variation, leading 
time, first-mover advantages, market age, technological change 
Acknowledgements. We acknowledge the comments and suggestions of Claudio Giachetti, Juan 
Maicas and Maria Jesús Nieto on an earlier version of this document. We also acknowledge 
financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness and FEDER 
(project ECO2017-85451-R), the Regional Government of Aragon and European Social Fund 




1 Pre-print version of Fuentelsaz, L., Garrido, E., & González, M. (2020). Ownership in cross-border 
acquisitions and entry timing of the target firm. Journal of World Business, 55(2), 101046. 
1 
 
OWNERSHIP IN CROSS-BORDER ACQUISITIONS AND ENTRY 
TIMING OF THE TARGET FIRM 
 
Abstract 
We examine how the entry timing of targets influences the initial and the post-entry 
percentage of ownership acquired by multinationals. We argue that targets that have 
entered earlier into the market launch signals of lower uncertainty in contexts where 
first-mover advantages exist. As a consequence, multinationals are willing to buy higher 
levels of ownership in these early entrant targets and to increase their participation in 
the subsidiary equity in the post-entry stage. Finding support for these relationships, we 
study how market age and innovative behaviour of the target reduce the importance of 
leading time as determinant of the ownership decision. 
 
Keywords: cross-border acquisitions, initial ownership, ownership variation, leading 






Cross-border acquisitions (CBAs), as key mechanisms in the internationalization of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs), have received increasing attention from international 
business literature (Bauer et al., 2018; Cuypers, Ertug, & Hennart, 2015; Fuad & Gaur, 
2019; Kumar, et al., 2019; Lahiri, Elango, & Kundu, 2014; Powell & Rhee, 2016). One 
of the most important decisions that firms have to take when they face a CBA is the level 
of equity ownership, as it has implications in terms of control, risk and resource 
commitment (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986) and the likelihood of survival (Li, 1995). In 
order to select the adequate level of ownership, MNEs should balance the expected 
benefits and the costs derived from different levels of ownership (Chari & Chang, 2009), 
assessing the contribution of the acquisition in the generation of competitive advantages 
and the subsequent risks. These risks increase in contexts where assessment of the 
potential value provided by the acquisition is more complex. In contrast to domestic 
acquisitions, MNEs that expand abroad through CBAs have to cope with higher levels of 
uncertainty derived from the differences in economic, social and political structures 
compared to their home countries (Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath, & Pisano, 2004). This 
uncertainty can be seen both from an ex ante and an ex post perspective (Chari & Chang, 
2009). Ex ante uncertainty is related to information asymmetries and adverse selection 
problems, while ex post uncertainty refers to problems of moral hazard and opportunism 
related to managers’ discretion in post-acquisition decisions. Both types of uncertainty 
make it difficult for MNEs to assess the potential of value creation in CBAs, and reduce 
the incentives to acquire high levels of ownership in the new subsidiary (Chari & Chang, 
2009). 
Identifying the factors that influence the uncertainty that acquirers face will help 
companies to improve their decision-making process. Previous studies have identified 
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several external and internal factors that influence the percentage of ownership held by 
MNEs (Ilhan-Nas et al., 2018; Xie, Reddy, & Liang, 2017). Malhotra and Gaur (2014) 
demonstrate how geographic distance influences both ex ante and ex post uncertainty. 
Similarly, other authors demonstrate that environmental distance favours or diminishes 
the level of uncertainty that affects the firm in its decision (Dow, Cuypers, & Ertug, 2016; 
Liou, Chao, & Yang, 2016). Other external factors, such as country risk (Chari & Chang, 
2009), institutional pressures (Chan & Makino, 2007) and political influences (Pan et al., 
2014), have been considered. The literature has also analysed the role in the ownership 
decision of MNE-level factors, such as international experience in different environments 
(Powell & Rhee, 2016) and the adoption of English as an external reporting language in 
the company (Jeanjean et al., 2015). However, these prior studies have mainly focused 
on characteristics of home and host markets and on the attributes of the acquirer firm, 
ignoring the study of one of the key parties influencing the level of uncertainty—the target 
firm. Except for one study (Chari & Chang, 2009), the influence of the target firm’s 
characteristics in the decision on level of ownership acquired by the MNE has been 
underexplored.  
Targets possess attributes that can impact the ex ante and ex post uncertainties of 
the acquisition process and thus influence MNEs’ incentives to acquire a higher or lower 
level of ownership. In contexts where first-mover advantages exist, earlier entrants obtain 
a higher performance than late newcomers (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988, 1998). The 
entry timing of the target firm can act as a signal for its potential to be profitable in the 
future, reducing uncertainty and thus increasing the MNE’s willingness to hold a higher 
level of ownership. To our knowledge, an analysis of entry timing has not been previously 
integrated into the study of equity ownership in CBAs. 
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Furthermore, previous studies have adopted a static viewpoint by focusing on the 
initial ownership acquired by MNEs. In contrast, this research insists on the importance 
of considering the CBA as a dynamic process that begins with selection of the target and 
negotiation of the initial level of equity to acquire, and continues with the post-acquisition 
period during which the MNE should integrate the subsidiary into its organizational 
structure (Shimizu et al., 2004). After the initial acquisition, where ex ante and ex post 
uncertainties can be seen as key factors in determining the ownership initially acquired, 
MNEs’ perception of the potential of the target to generate value may change as a 
consequence of learning; thus, MNEs might adapt their levels of ownership to the 
perceived uncertainty. For instance, Inkpen and Beamish (1997) posit that partial 
ownership is usually turned into full ownership as MNEs gain knowledge of the local 
conditions and as partner dependency decreases. Other studies show that companies 
complete acquisitions sequentially, not all in one go at the outset (Xu, Zhou, & Phan, 
2010). In this vein, studies have recently started to analyse the changing position of 
MNEs’ commitment when developing CBAs to gain strategic flexibility. As MNEs face 
initial ex ante and ex post uncertainty, they prefer to enter through low-commitment 
modes. Once they have gained experience and information from the new market and 
partners, they can decide to increase their commitment (e.g. establish a wholly owned 
subsidiary), to decrease it or even to terminate the relationship (Petersen, Welch, & 
Welch, 2000). Although recent studies have shed light on this topic (Li & Li, 2010; Puck, 
Holtbrügge, & Mohr, 2009; Putzhammer et al., 2018; Putzhammer, Puck, & Lindner, 
2019; Santangelo & Meyer, 2011; Swoboda, Olejnik, & Morschett, 2011), prior studies 
have not considered the role of entry timing of the target firm in signifying potential 
performance that can affect post-entry ownership variations.  
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The objective of our study is to analyse the effect of the entry timing of the target 
firm on the level of ownership held by the MNE when a CBA takes place by integrating 
the equity ownership and first-mover literatures through a dynamic perspective. Firstly, 
we propose that, as the time elapsed between the entry of the pioneer and the target—the 
leading time—increases, the ownership of that target initially acquired by the MNE will 
be lower. Secondly, with the aim of incorporating a dynamic perspective into the study, 
we also analyse the effect of leading time on variations in the level of ownership after the 
initial acquisition. Finally, given that first-mover advantages erode with market age and 
the introduction of new technologies (Gómez, Lanzolla, & Maícas, 2016), we expect that 
these two moderating factors will weaken the relationship between leading time and 
initial ownership and post-entry variations of ownership. 
The contribution of this article is twofold. Firstly, while previous studies on 
ownership equity have mainly focused on country-level and MNE-level determinants, we 
focus on a key target attribute—namely, the leading time between the entry of the pioneer 
and that of the target into the market. This is a key variable that influences current and 
potential performance in those industries where first-mover advantages exist (Gómez & 
Maícas, 2011). In this way, we integrate the first-mover advantages literature into the 
analysis of ownership strategy in CBAs, responding to the Zachary et al.’s (2015) call for 
a broader view of business entry. These literatures have usually been treated 
independently, with the exception of Isobe, Makino, and Montgomery (2000), who find 
a negative relationship between the degree of a foreign firm’s control over a joint venture 
and the early entry of this foreign firm in an emerging market.  
Secondly, we incorporate a dynamic perspective into the study by analysing the 
effect of leading time not only on the initial level of acquired ownership, but also on the 
variation in ownership level in the post-entry period. Although prior literature has 
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recently started to analyse variation in entry modes and ownership strategies over time, 
the effect of leading time on this dynamic process has not previously been analysed.  
Moreover, as the market matures and subsidiaries introduce new technologies, first-
mover advantages are eroded. This will make leading time less relevant as a determinant 
of the ownership decision.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1. Initial ownership level in foreign market entry 
Choosing the initial level of ownership in a CBA is an important decision when 
MNEs enter into foreign markets. Acquisition of a higher level of ownership in the target 
firm allows complete control over operations, facilitating carrying out the functions of 
management within the company and access to a greater percentage of the profits; but it 
also entails greater risks and costs due to the commitment of resources and a lack of 
flexibility (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). Alternatively, a lower level of ownership 
provides access to complementary resources that were not previously available and 
facilitates the diversification of risks (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). The flip side of a 
lower level of ownership is that it leads to potential opportunistic costs associated with 
the post-acquisition integration, and to a lack of control. Previous studies have analysed 
the optimal percentage of ownership held by MNEs in terms of these costs and profits, 
highlighting the role of market imperfections in this important decision (Chari & Chang, 
2009; Li & Li, 2010). Market imperfections, such as adverse selection and moral hazard, 
result in higher transaction costs and arise from a lack of knowledge of the host country 
(Malhotra & Gaur, 2014). 
When MNEs expand to a new host market through a CBA, they often lack sufficient 
knowledge of the new context. The environment in their home country may be 
substantially different, which increases the challenge of understanding the complexities 
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of doing business in the host country (Kostova, 1999; Mezias, 2002). Because of 
differences in culture, norms and regulations, political and social structures, or economic 
conditions, companies face the difficulties inherent in being foreign in the new 
environment (Hymer, 1960, 1976; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). The consequent 
information asymmetry does not allow them to assess properly the value of the acquired 
target and is manifested in two forms: the ex ante problem of adverse selection and the ex 
post problem of moral hazard. 
Ex ante uncertainty, rooted in the information economics literature (Akerlof, 1970), 
arises because acquirers need to gather information about the target firm, the industry in 
which it operates and the country where it is established (Shimizu et al., 2004). This 
information helps acquirers to evaluate and then manage the target firm. In an acquisition, 
targets have better information about themselves than the acquirer has. The target 
company has greater incentives to disclose positive information to potential acquirers, 
which leads to an adverse selection problem (Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993; Reuer & Koza, 
2000). As a possible solution to asymmetric information, MNEs may buy a small share 
in the target firm. Prior shareholders of the subsidiary will retain higher levels of equity 
to transmit a credible signal of confidence about the quality of the target (Chen & Hennart, 
2004).  
The ex post argument is grounded in the literature on transaction costs economics 
(Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Hennart, 1991; Williamson, 1979). After the MNE has 
acquired a subsidiary, the latter has tacit knowledge about the business that can be critical 
to working effectively in the local environment, and thus to the success of the firm. Local 
managers understand suppliers and governments, have prior experience in managing 
relationships with the local workforce, and are familiar with the preferences of 
consumers. Therefore, MNEs prefer to delegate responsibilities to them (Kogut & Singh, 
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1988). The acquirer has to face the risk of a change in the motivation and behaviour of 
local managers after the acquisition. This lower motivation comes from the erosion of 
managers’ incentives (Williamson, 1985) since, in the previously independent local 
company, they were subject to the discipline of the stock market and now they do not 
benefit from their direct interest in the ownership (Chari & Chang, 2009). In addition, 
Chen and Hennart (2004) point out that since acquisition contracts cannot be fully 
specified, managers of target firms may behave in an opportunistic way after the 
acquisition. Managers may delay the transfer of critical tacit assets such as knowledge 
and relationships with the local market to continue to be useful to the acquirer. Anderson 
and Gatignon (1986) posit that to confront this internal uncertainty, the acquirer should 
know how to evaluate managers’ results and incentivize them. This may be easier in 
domestic acquisitions, but in a CBA it is necessary to have prior international experience 
to be able to identify and confront managers’ opportunistic behaviour. When international 
experience is low or home and host institutional contexts differ, low control levels can be 
more efficient (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). As a consequence, the acquirer will prefer 
to take less equity to preserve the incentives of the target company's managers to continue 
working with the same self-demanding levels as before the acquisition (Dow et al., 2016). 
In sum, when companies are faced with high uncertainty, shared ownership 
structures can be employed to reduce the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard, 
and MNEs will tend to acquire lower levels of ownership (Malhotra & Gaur, 2014). 
Shared ownership encourages the acquired firm to disclose accurate information and 
enhances co-operation in the post-acquisition phase.  
Previous literature has analysed factors that influence uncertainty and the 
subsequent ownership decision. For instance, geographic, institutional, linguistic and 
religious distances have been shown to increase uncertainty and reduce the level of 
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ownership held by MNEs (Cuypers et al., 2015; Demirbag, Glaister, & Tatolu, 2007; 
Malhotra & Gaur, 2014), while MNE international experience increases the level of 
equity ownership (Powell & Rhee, 2016). However, these prior studies have mainly 
focused on characteristics of home and host markets and on the attributes of the acquirer 
firm, ignoring the study of one of the key parties influencing the level of uncertainty, the 
target firm. The influence of the characteristics of the subsidiary in the decision on the 
level of ownership acquired by the MNE has been underexplored.  
2.2. Ownership variation during the post-entry time 
Once the acquirer has invested in the target firm, uncertainty may be reduced 
because the former can obtain direct information from the company, the local managers 
and the environment, which can lead to post-entry variation in its resource commitment 
in the subsidiary (Clark, Pugh, & Mallory, 1997; Petersen et al., 2000; Puck et al., 2009; 
Putzhammer et al., 2018; Putzhammer et al., 2019; Swoboda et al., 2011). Therefore, 
acquirers that entered with low control modes can vary their ownership in the target firm 
once they gain experience and learning. This ability and preparedness to change 
ownership in the post-entry time has been conceptualized as “strategic flexibility” 
(Petersen et al., 2000, p. 689). Although research in this field is still scarce, some authors 
have tried to determine the factors that influence post-entry changes in 
internationalization mode (Calof & Beamish, 1995; Petersen et al., 2000), in conversion 
from joint ventures to wholly-owned subsidiaries (Puck et al., 2009), in increased 
ownership (Jeanjean et al., 2015; Song, 2017), or in divestment and termination 
(Belderbos & Zou, 2009; Petersen et al., 2000). Based on organizational learning and 
experiential learning theories, we can group the determinants of this variation in the 
resource commitment during the post-entry time into four categories: internal 
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environment, external environment, managerial attitude and performance (Swoboda et 
al., 2011). 
The internal environment refers to factors that are potentially under the control of a 
firm, such as strategy and resources (Calof & Beamish, 1995). After entry, the MNE 
obtains direct information from the activity of the target and is able to better evaluate its 
performance and managers’ behaviour (Petersen et al., 2000), and the sources of 
uncertainty that existed prior to the entry tend to disappear. With this additional 
information, the MNE could decide to increase its resource commitment. It should be 
noted that the knowledge the MNE gains from the target can also be negative (e.g. because 
the MNE becomes aware that the initial valuation of the target was overestimated) and 
decide on disinvestment and even termination of the venture (Driffield, Mickiewicz & 
Temouri, 2016; Petersen et al., 2000). 
Regarding the external environment, changes in factors that are outside the direct 
control of the MNE, such as political stability, government policy or competition, could 
cause changes in ownership levels. Deterioration of environmental factors could lead to 
disinvestments, while their improvement could result in a greater commitment of 
resources (Calof & Beamish, 1995).  
Swoboda et al. (2011) also discuss about managerial attitudes as determinants of 
changes in ownership levels, where attitudes are defined as managers’ intentions, beliefs 
and feelings about commitment (Calof & Beamish, 1995). Decisions are not always made 
rationally. Sometimes, managers’ decisions are based on intuition, which can be equal to 
or more efficient than rational decisions (Dane & Pratt, 2007). The motivation to increase 
the commitment of resources may derive from managers’ personal perception of 
favourable conditions (Boddewyn, 1985), or by personal attitudes (Fletcher, 2001).  
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Finally, the performance achieved by the target firm can also influence the level of 
commitment (Swoboda et al., 2011). The current and potential performance of the target 
is a decisive variable to change their ownership level in the post-entry time. If MNEs 
estimate that the target has great potential performance in the future, the probability of 
increasing the resource commitment will be higher; however, if they estimate low future 
performance, the effect may be the opposite (Petersen et al., 2000). 
2.3. Entry timing and first-mover advantages 
The literature on entry timing has been extensive since the publication of Lieberman 
and Montgomery's seminal article in 1988. First-mover advantages arise when the 
pioneers in a market obtain benefits in terms of profitability, value creation or survival 
(Lieberman & Montgomery, 2013). These advantages derive from the exploitation of 
scale and learning economies and reputation advantages, the creation of customers’ 
switching costs, or the ability to create links with key stakeholders such as local 
government or suppliers (Gómez & Maícas, 2011; Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). 
There is also a literature that focuses on the existence of first-mover disadvantages 
(Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988) that derive from the ability to ‘free-ride’ in first-mover 
investments, the resolution of technological and market uncertainty, the existence of 
technological discontinuities that provide ‘gateways’ to new entrants, and early entrants’ 
difficulties adapting to environmental changes (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). 
Focusing on a context where first-mover advantages exceed the disadvantages, 
academic research has identified three groups of factors under which early entry is a 
profitable strategy (Suarez & Lanzolla, 2007). First, resources and capabilities at the firm 
level, such as management skills (Murthi, Srinivasan, & Kalyanaram, 1996) and product 
development skills (Robinson & Chiang, 2002) favour the exploitation of first-mover 
advantages. Second, environmental factors, such as market transparency, environmental 
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uncertainty and the stage of the industry lifecycle determine the initial first-mover 
advantages enjoyed by the pioneer and their sustainability (Suarez & Lanzolla, 2007). 
Thirdly, isolating mechanisms prevent late entrants from catching up with the pioneers 
(Rumelt, 1987). The most widely accepted classification of isolating mechanisms 
(Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988) is based on three different categories: a) technology 
leadership, through the learning and experience curve or the existence of R&D patents; 
b) the pre-emption of scarce assets, which includes the advantages of choosing niche 
markets or economies of scale derived from investment in equipment; and c) switching 
costs and buyer choice under uncertainty arising from the formation of habits in buyers 
and the firm’s reputation. 
Previous research has usually demonstrated the existence of a positive relationship 
between early entry and firm performance (García-Villaverde, Ruiz-Ortega, & Parra-
Requena, 2012; Gómez & Maícas, 2011), but mixed or contradictory results can also be 
found. For this reason, researchers have tried to address the question of whether early-
mover advantages are static or can be eroded (Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 1999). There are 
circumstances that cause the disadvantages of being early entrants to outweigh its 
advantages (Lieberman & Montgomery, 2013). External factors can undermine the 
persistence of first-mover advantages through their negative impact on the effectiveness 
of isolating mechanisms (Gómez et al., 2016). Boulding and Christen (2003, 2008) show 
that, in more mature markets, the costs associated with late entry are compensated by 
some advantages associated with being a late entrant and conclude that pioneer 
advantages erode over time, usually after twelve to fourteen years. Similarly, Gómez et 
al. (2016) demonstrate that a technological discontinuity can reduce the sustainability of 
technological leadership or the effectiveness of resource pre-emption, negatively 




3.1. Subsidiary entry timing and initial ownership level 
As noted, decisions about the initial level of acquired ownership are strongly 
conditioned by the existence of ex ante and ex post uncertainty resulting from information 
asymmetries. Information economics literature suggests that acquisitions are hazardous 
due to the adverse selection problem between acquirers and potential targets (see, for 
instance, Reuer & Ragozzino, 2008). Another source of uncertainty in these decisions is 
the existence of moral hazard because of managerial opportunism. In order to reduce this 
uncertainty, MNEs may choose to acquire lower levels of ownership in the target 
company (Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993; Chari & Chang, 2009). 
One way to deal with this uncertainty is to pay more attention to the characteristics 
of target firms. Recent studies have emphasized the importance of taking into account the 
role of the target company in strategic decisions (Cuypers, Cuypers, & Martin, 2017). 
Some target attributes may help MNEs to assess the potential of the company to generate 
future profitability better, decreasing ex ante and ex post uncertainty. In a context of 
asymmetric information, and according to signalling theory (Spence, 1974; Riley, 2001), 
signals can be launched by companies to convey private information and improve the 
existing information imbalance. Empirically, Reuer and Ragozzino (2012) show that 
taking into account the signals launched by target firms reduces asymmetric information 
problems and allows MNEs to make better decisions about the level of ownership. MNEs 
should therefore pay attention to the attributes of the subsidiary with the aim of reducing 
the level of perceived uncertainty, which will increase the incentive to take higher control 
of the target company. 
In a context where first-mover advantages exist, one signal for MNEs of the 
potential of the target company will be its entry timing into the market. Early entrants are 
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able to outperform late entrants in terms of profitability and market share (Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 2013). The leading time between the entry of the pioneer and the entry of 
the target company provides valuable information for MNEs when they decide the level 
of ownership to acquire in the target firm. If the acquired firm is an early entrant, MNEs 
receive valuable additional information about its greater expected performance, which 
reduces the cost associated with obtaining information to overcome the problem of 
adverse selection. In addition, early entrants usually enjoy a better reputation (Kerin, 
Varadarajan, & Peterson, 1992). As a consequence, the problem of adverse selection will 
be reduced. On the one hand, a better reputation decreases the acquiring company’s costs 
derived from obtaining information about the target. On the other hand, the target firm 
enjoys a positive image, so it does not have as strong an incentive to retain ownership to 
transmit confidence to the acquirer. Therefore, when the subsidiary is an early entrant, 
MNEs will perceive lower ex ante uncertainty than when it is a late entrant. Consequently, 
the initial ownership acquired will be lower as the leading time increases.  
When first-mover advantages exist and the target firm is an early entrant, its 
advantage will depend on resources and capabilities that have been built over time, such 
as technological leadership, exclusive access to strategic geographical locations, 
reputation and pre-emption of scarce resources, among others (Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1988). Thus, the success of the company will depend more heavily on the 
entry timing than on the specific skills of local managers and their incentives to 
collaborate after the entry. Even the resignation of a local manager in the post-entry period 
would not reduce the value of the assets acquired, reducing the moral hazard linked to ex 
post uncertainty. Therefore, when the subsidiary is an early entrant, MNEs will perceive 




As a consequence, ex ante and ex post uncertainties surrounding ownership 
acquisitions increase with the leading time—that is, the time elapsed from the entry of 
the pioneer and the entry of the subsidiary into the focal market. Consequently, MNEs 
will acquire a lower level of ownership when the target has entered later into the market 
than when it was an early entrant. 
H1. The percentage of ownership initially acquired is negatively related to the 
leading time between the entry of the pioneer and the entry of the target.  
3.2. Subsidiary entry timing and ownership variation during post-entry time 
The extant literature has shown that many acquisitions are carried out sequentially 
to deal with information asymmetries (Xu et al., 2010). Although MNEs commit 
resources at the initial acquisition, they can change its ownership over time, either 
increasing or reducing it according to the information obtained from the new subsidiary 
and its environment (Belderbos, Tong, & Wu, 2019; Putzhammer et al., 2018; 
Putzhammer, et al., 2019; Song, 2017). During post-entry time, MNEs will obtain more 
precise information about the internal conditions and the external environment of the 
subsidiary, which can allow MNEs to better assess its potential to take advantage of the 
new opportunities available. This new information may lead to positive or negative 
variations in the ownership held by the MNE in the target firm (Swoboda et al., 2011). 
First, with regard to the internal conditions of the target firm, the possession of first-
mover advantages is observed by the MNE before the initial acquisition based on the 
available market information and the data that the target provides to the acquirer. 
Nevertheless, adverse selection may bias this information (Petersen et al., 2000). In the 
post-entry period, the MNE obtains direct information about the target, helping it to assess 
the existence and scope of first-mover advantages and the resources and capabilities that 
can help to maintain them over time. For example, MNEs can better assess the level of 
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explorative capabilities possessed by subsidiaries, which previous studies have shown to 
be positively related to potential performance (Lisboa, Skarmeas, & Lages, 2011). 
Subsidiaries that entered earlier in the market and enjoy first-mover advantages possess 
specific skills, knowledge and greater experience and, therefore, they have developed 
higher explorative capabilities than later entrants in both market and product 
development. The confirmation of the existence of explorative capabilities constitutes a 
signal of positive expected performance. Subsequently, MNEs are willing to increase 
their resource commitment in these subsidiaries. Likewise, the existence of key intangible 
assets possessed by early entrants, which could not be previously observed (just inferred) 
-such as technological capabilities that lead to first-mover advantages (Lieberman and 
Montgomery, 1988)- may also be confirmed. These explorative capabilities and 
intangible resources possessed by early entrants are a source of future market value and 
financial performance (Tahat, Ahmed, & Alhadab, 2018), which can motivate MNEs to 
increase their ownership once they are verified. 
Second, after the initial acquisition, the acquirer also obtains direct information 
regarding the external environment in which the subsidiary develops its activity. Since a 
lack of familiarity with the host country conditions is one of the reasons of initially 
acquiring lower levels of ownership in CBA (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986), once the 
MNE gains experience in the host country and confirms its positive expectations about 
the subsidiary, we can expect that MNEs will be willing to acquire higher levels of 
ownership (Song, 2017). However, it should be noted that host countries differ in terms 
of their environmental stability (Makino, Isobe, & Chan, 2004). According to Swoboda 
et al. (2011), MNEs change their ownership positions depending on the evolution of 
environmental conditions, such as government regulations (Puck et al., 2009), corruption 
levels (Driffield et al., 2016) and labor costs (Song, 2017). Although these external 
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changes can create shocks in the market, Vecchiato (2015) posits that early entrants have 
been able to develop dynamic capabilities to anticipate and better adapt to the 
environmental shocks than late entrants as they have been competing in the market for a 
longer time and so have greater experience. For this reason, MNEs will have more 
incentives to increase their ownership in early entrants once first mover advantages have 
been confirmed since the dynamic capabilities developed serve to counteract the 
uncertainty that comes from a changing environment.  
To summarize, after the initial acquisition, MNEs can better evaluate the potential 
of the subsidiary to generate future profitability and to counteract environmental changes 
that could diminish it. Driffield et al. (2016) insist on the importance of a target’s 
characteristics to explain changes in ownership levels. Our logic is that those subsidiaries 
that are early entrants in a market may have developed valuable skills and resources that 
launch signals concerning higher future profitability. Among them, we can mention 
explorative capabilities that facilitate the identification of market opportunities, 
technological capabilities to exploit these opportunities and dynamic capabilities to 
identify and better adapt to environmental changes. Although MNEs can infer the 
possession of these valuable assets at the moment of the initial acquisition based on the 
target’s financial statements, MNEs can only corroborate the existence of these resources 
after the initial acquisition. When first-mover advantages exist and MNEs verify them, 
MNEs will be willing to commit more resources to early entrants than to late entrant 
subsidiaries during the post-entry period since the sources of uncertainty are reduced. In 
this context, the size of these first mover advantages are often linked to the leading time 
between the entry of the pioneer and that of the subsidiary. Conversely, the advantages 
diminish when the subsidiary delays its entrance into the market, which reduces the 
incentives to buy higher shares of ownership. 
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H2. The variation in the percentage of ownership after the initial acquisition is 
negatively related to the leading time between the entry of the pioneer and the entry 
of the subsidiary. 
3.3. The moderating effect of market age 
Previous studies have found that early entry advantages dissipate over time (Brown 
& Lattin, 1994; Huff & Robinson, 1994; Robinson & Fornell, 1985). The main reason for 
this is that the isolating mechanisms that allow first-mover advantages (i.e. pre-emption 
of scarce assets, switching cost and technological leadership) (Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1988) weaken over time as the market matures. If isolating mechanisms 
fail and first-mover advantages are eroded, the leading time will lose its value in reducing 
uncertainty and signalling potential performance. 
Isolating mechanisms might lose value with market age for different reasons. 
Firstly, early-mover targets can pre-empt scarce assets. This confers early entrants a 
strong market position that, at the same time, constitutes an obstacle for followers to 
overcome (Boulding & Christen, 2003). Nevertheless, the appearance of new consumers 
and a change in preferences will widen the market and weaken the initial position of early 
entrants, thus decreasing first-mover advantages. Secondly, switching costs, which arise 
when consumers face additional costs to change from early entrants to a new firm due to 
procedural, financial and relational costs (Burnham, Frels, & Mahajan, 2003), might also 
decrease over time. Late entrants have to invest resources and time to attract established 
consumers, which reduces their performance. However, when the market matures, 
consumers are more familiar with the products and the competitors that supply them, 
which will erode the existing first-mover advantages. Thirdly, early entrants can enjoy 
technological leadership in terms of the experience curve (Lieberman & Montgomery, 
1988). As a consequence of learning economies, early entrants are able to produce more 
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efficiently due to an increase in cumulative production. This allows early entrants to 
reduce costs in comparison to late entrants and enjoy higher profitability (Ghemawat & 
Spence, 1985). However, as time passes, later entrants also learn and are able to develop 
their own experience curves. Therefore, first-mover advantages derived from experience 
decrease progressively, finally disappearing. Thus, the advantages of early entrants may 
be eroded over time.  
As a consequence, leading time loses importance as a determinant of uncertainty 
and potential performance because isolating mechanisms are weakened and first-mover 
advantages are eroded. Consequently, although MNEs could have more incentives to hold 
higher levels of ownership in subsidiaries with lower leading time (both at the initial entry 
and during the post-entry period), this negative relationship will be less negative as the 
market matures. 
H3a. Market age positively moderates (i.e. weakens) the relationship between the 
percentage of ownership initially acquired by an MNE and the leading time between 
the entry of the pioneer and the entry of the subsidiary. 
H3b. Market age positively moderates (i.e. weakens) the relationship between the 
variation of percentage of ownership after the initial acquisition and the leading 
time between the entry of the pioneer and the entry of the subsidiary. 
 
3.4. The moderating effect of the introduction of a new technology 
In addition to market age, the increasing dynamism of many industries makes first-
mover advantages hard to maintain (Suarez & Lanzolla, 2007). For example, previous 
studies agree that rapid technological evolution makes it difficult for early entrants to 
maintain any advantage (Fosfuri, Lanzolla, & Suarez, 2013). The introduction of a new 
technology constitutes an important factor that can erode first-mover advantages (Lavie, 
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2006), impairing the effectiveness of isolating mechanisms. There are several reasons for 
this erosion. Firstly, new technologies reduce the likelihood of the pre-emption of scarce 
assets being sustained. The emergence of new technologies may, for example, change the 
relationship of the company with its current providers, modifying the value of important 
resources, even leading to a change in these providers (Gómez et al., 2016). Secondly, 
the effectiveness of switching costs will also be adversely affected. A new technology 
can affect experience (Wernerfelt, 1985) and the formation of preferences (Carpenter & 
Nakamoto, 1989), two antecedents of switching costs (Suarez & Lanzolla, 2007). New 
generations of products or services will appear and the existing ones will become obsolete 
(Anderson & Tushman, 1990). Thirdly, technological leadership is probably the isolating 
mechanism that can fail most often as a result of the introduction of a new technology. 
Firms that entered the market first will have gained advantages derived from experience 
or learning curves, obtaining a privileged position. However, the introduction of a new 
technology decreases the value of prior experience and can result in advantages for those 
companies that introduced the technological discontinuity into the market (Christensen, 
2013), even if they were late entrants. 
The innovative behaviour of a subsidiary through the introduction of a new 
technology provides a signal about its potential for obtaining future profitability, thus 
reducing uncertainty. If the new technology is successful, the subsidiary that first exploits 
it can achieve extraordinary results by destroying the benefits of prior technologies. This 
explains why companies that have advantages in old technologies are usually reluctant to 
introduce technological changes that can cannibalize the previous profitability 
(Christensen, 1997; Hill & Rothaermel, 2003). A subsidiary that introduces a new 
technology into the market assumes risks, but it can achieve a technological leadership to 
obtain extraordinary profits in the future by eroding the advantages of prior entrants. As 
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a consequence, the introduction of a new technology by a subsidiary launches a positive 
signal that increases its attractiveness for current and potential investors (Reuer & 
Ragozzino, 2012).  
In sum, the introduction of a new technology erodes first-mover advantages and 
reduces the negative impact of leading time on the level of ownership in a subsidiary held 
by MNEs. Target companies that introduce new technologies will be especially attractive 
for the acquiring MNE, with the subsequent incentive to acquire higher levels of 
ownership initially and to increase the level of ownership held in these targets, even if 
they are late movers.  
H4a. The introduction of a new technology by a subsidiary positively moderates 
(i.e. weakens) the relationship between the percentage of ownership initially 
acquired by a MNE and the leading time between the entry of the pioneer and the 
entry of the subsidiary. 
H4b. The introduction of a new technology by a subsidiary positively moderates 
(i.e. weakens) the relationship between the variation of the percentage of ownership 
after the initial acquisition and the leading time between the entry of the pioneer 
and the entry of the subsidiary. 
 
4. SAMPLE, METHODS AND VARIABLES 
4.1. The mobile communications industry 
The empirical analysis is carried out in the mobile communications industry. The 
available data offer the quarterly evolution from 2000 to 2016 in the ownership structure 
of 59 subsidiaries in which 36 MNEs participated as a result of 90 CBAs in 50 countries.2 
 
2 See Appendix 1 for a detailed list of the different host and home countries included in the sample. It should 
be noted that GSMA only provides information at the national level. As a consequence, countries where 
competition takes place at subnational level, such as the United States, Canada, Brazil or India, cannot be 
included in our sample of host countries. 
22 
 
Accordingly, we have a total of 90 observations of the initial ownership acquired and 
2,231 observations referring to the ownership held by MNEs in each one of the 
subsidiaries for each period after the initial acquisition. Our information comes from 
multiple sources, but the main one is the GSMA Intelligence (2018) dataset. This 
publication gathers information on several variables of interest, such as the existing 
telecommunications MNEs, the ownership held in each subsidiary, and the date of entry 
of each subsidiary into each market and technology. The information about CBAs and 
entry timing is complemented by industry and corporate reports. Other sources of 
information, such as the Heritage Foundation and the World Development Indicators 
databases, have been used for control variables. 
 The mobile communications industry has seen impressive growth in the last two 
decades, and it has been the focus of attention of an increasing number of researchers 
(Birke & Swann, 2006; Fuentelsaz, Garrido, & Maícas, 2015; Gómez et al., 2016; 
Kitchen, Martin, & Che-Ha, 2015). This industry is especially appropriate for our 
research purposes for several reasons. Firstly, it is an industry with a high level of 
internationalization. For instance, 52 per cent of firms in the third quarter of 2017 were 
subsidiaries of telecommunications MNEs. The internationalization of these MNEs has 
been recent. At the beginning of 2000, there were 56 MNEs operating in 142 countries 
with 293 entries, while at the end of 2016, 76 MNEs were present in 205 markets, with a 
total of 926 entries. This means that 68.4 per cent of entries have taken place during the 
period under analysis. Moreover, this international expansion has mainly taken place 
through CBAs because of government restrictions.3  
 
3 In this industry, governments usually determine the number of competitors. Companies that operate in 
each national market must obtain a licence to develop their activity, since the radio spectrum is considered 
a scarce resource (Gruber, 2005). The government decides the number and types of licences. At the 
European level, for instance, usually only three or four firms operate in each country. This means a 
restriction to the entry of new competitors through greenfields and makes CBAs the most frequent entry 
mode in this industry. For the countries included in our sample, only 35 per cent of entries were greenfields. 
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Secondly, first-mover advantages have been demonstrated to exist in an industry 
where competition takes place at the national level (Gómez & Maícas, 2011; Whalley & 
Curwen, 2012).4 It has been argued that early movers possess significant advantages that 
late entrants have found difficult to overturn as a consequence of isolating mechanisms 
(Atiyas & Doğan, 2007; Bijwaard, Janssen, & Maasland, 2008; Whalley & Curwen, 
2012).5  
Thirdly, this industry allows a detailed identification of the entry timing of each 
firm from the beginning of the industry in the 1990s. We are thus able to identify the entry 
timing of subsidiaries and the leading time from the entry of the pioneer in each market. 
Moreover, this industry allows identification of the firm that introduced a new technology 
into the market. Over the last decade, the most important technological change in the 
industry has been the transition from the second (2G) to the third generation (3G), which 
allowed consumers to use the internet on their devices, and the progressive substitution 
of voice and text services by data exchange (Fuentelsaz, Maícas, & Polo, 2008).  
4.2. Methods 
The empirical analysis is developed in two stages that consider the target firm of 
each CBA as the unit of analysis. In the first stage, we analyse the effect of leading time 
on the percentage of initial ownership acquired by a MNE when it enters a market 
(Hypothesis 1) and the moderation effects of market age and the introduction of a new 
technology on this relationship (Hypotheses 3a and 3b). As the percentage of initial 
ownership is a limited dependent variable subject to an upper (100%) and a lower (10%) 
bound, a classic ordinary least squares regression model will give biased and inconsistent 
 
4 Consumers can only choose between competitors that operate in the same geographical market where they 
are located. This explains why the analysis of first-mover advantages in this industry has been limited to 
country-level competition (Gómez & Maícas, 2011). 
5 A robustness analysis (not shown) has been carried out to confirm the existence of early-mover advantages 
in our sample. This analysis concludes that early entrants enjoy better results in this industry. 
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estimates (Maddala, 1983). In this case, a Tobit regression analysis is recommended 
(Greene, 1993). This estimation technique has been adopted in prior studies that analyse 
the determinants of ownership levels (Chari & Chang, 2009; Cuypers et al., 2015; Dow 
et al., 2016; Malhotra & Gaur, 2014; Pan et al., 2014). 
The second stage analyses the effect of leading time on variation in the percentage 
of ownership during the post-entry period (Hypothesis 2) and the moderating effect of 
market age and the introduction of a new technology on the prior relationship (Hypotheses 
3b and 4b). As we will explain in the next subsection, ownership variation is also a limited 
dependent variable subject to an upper (90%) and a lower (-90%) bound. This variation 
is analysed for each subsidiary over time, so we have a panel dataset with a limited 
dependent variable. To avoid the problem of unobservable heterogeneity, we use a 
random-effects Tobit estimation with panel data (Arellano, 2003). 
4.3. Dependent variables 
The dependent variable in the first stage is the percentage of initial ownership that 
the MNE (acquiring firm) acquires in the subsidiary (target firm). In line with recent 
studies (Cuypers et al., 2015; Dow et al., 2016; Malhotra & Gaur, 2014), we use a 
continuous variable that is bounded between 10 per cent and 100 per cent.6  
Our dependent variable for the second stage is the variation in the percentage of 
ownership (ownership variation) that MNEs have after the initial acquisition. This 
variable is calculated quarterly for each subsidiary after the initial entry until the last 
quarter of 2016. The variable is measured as the difference between the percentage that 
the MNE held in that quarter and the initial percentage of ownership acquired by the 
MNE. It takes the value 0 if the MNE has not changed its investment in the subsidiary, a 
 
6 We follow the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) by considering the existence of a foreign direct investment when the multinational 
enterprise owns at least 10 per cent of the subsidiary’s equity.  
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positive value when the MNE has increased its participation, and a negative value when 
the MNE has decided to sell some of its investment in that subsidiary. Consequently, the 
variable is bounded between -90 per cent and 90 per cent. 
4.4. Independent variables 
Leading time. This variable is calculated as the number of quarters between the 
entry of the pioneer into the market and the entry of the subsidiary.7 We consider that a 
firm was the pioneer if it was the first entrant into the market. Market pioneers show a 
time lag of zero, with positive values for followers or late entrants. Leading time is a 
constant variable over time. This measure has been previously used for similar purposes 
(see, for instance, Deng & Wang, 2016; Jakopin & Klein, 2012; Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 2013; Zachary et al., 2015).  
Market age. This continuous variable reflects, in each period, the number of 
quarters elapsed since the emergence of the industry in each country—or, in other words, 
since the entry of the pioneer.8  
New technology introduction. This variable is defined through a dummy that takes 
the value 1 if the subsidiary was the first firm to introduce 3G services and 0 otherwise. 
As we work with panel data in the second stage, this variable can change its value from 
0 to 1 from the period that the target launched 3G services (if this happened during the 
post-entry time).9 
 
7 As the market pioneer, we select the company that first entered into the second generation of mobile 
communications, given the scarce acceptance among consumers of the first generation (1G or analog), that 
only achieved a penetration rate of 0.92 per cent at the beginning of 1990 (Gómez & Maícas, 2011).  
8 For example, imagine that the pioneer enters the market in the first quarter of 2002 and a second operator 
enters in the first quarter of 2005. The variable market age will take the value 12 when the second operator 
enters the market. Market age is a time-varying variable that increases each quarter after the entry of the 
pioneer. 
9 If two or more subsidiaries in the same market introduced 3G services at the same time, this variable takes 
the value 1 for the two companies from the period in which they introduced 3G.  
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4.5. Control variables 
As in previous studies, our models control for subsidiary-, MNE- and market-
specific characteristics that can influence the level of ownership held in the two stages, 
that is, at the time of entry and in the post-entry period. With regard to subsidiaries’ 
characteristics, we control for the subsidiary size, defined as the number of connections 
(in thousands) of the target firm in the market. Foreign firms will seek lower levels of 
ownership in local firms when these firms are larger than when they are smaller (Chari & 
Chang, 2009). We also control for the subsidiary performance measured through the 
EBITDA margin.10 MNEs will tend to acquire higher levels of ownership in subsidiaries 
that show better performance, since this represents less uncertainty for the acquirer. In 
addition, previous literature has shown that subsidiary performance could be a 
determinant of the increase or decrease in the commitment of resources after the initial 
acquisition (Swoboda et al., 2011). 
With regard to MNE characteristics, we control for prior presence in a given 
country since it is expected to positively influence the level of ownership held in 
subsequent entries into the same market (Kogut & Singh, 1988). Chen and Hennart (2004) 
consider that previous experience in the market can help MNEs to evaluate target firms 
better, which is expected to reduce uncertainty. To consider this possibility, we use a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the MNE had at least one subsidiary 
operating in the target firm’s country before the acquisition and 0 otherwise (Chari & 
Chang, 2009; Dow et al., 2016; Malhotra & Gaur, 2014). We also take into account the 
number of countries in which the MNE was operating as a measure of international 
experience. We expect that companies with more international experience will better 
 
10 The EBITDA margin is a ratio where the numerator is the total EBITDA obtained by the firm (total 




manage the risks of foreign operations and will therefore prefer to acquire higher levels 
of ownership (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Kogut & Singh, 1988). Moreover, different 
levels of international experience can influence the subsequent decision to commit 
resources in the post-acquisition period (Putzhammer et al., 2018). Given that larger firms 
may perceive lower uncertainty in ownership decisions because of their greater product 
diversity, market power, experience or other resource endowments (Scherer & Ross, 
1990), we also control for parent size, defined as the number of connections11 of the MNE 
in all markets where it is present.  
Referring to market characteristics, we have included variables that control for the 
conditions of the country where the subsidiary is located, as well as variables that control 
for the distance between the conditions of the host and the home country of the acquirer. 
With regard to the variables that refer to the host country where the CBA takes place, we 
first include the GDP per capita (in thousands), provided by the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) database (World Bank, 2018). Countries with higher GDP per capita 
are usually considered as having lower uncertainty, thus being more attractive to 
international investment (Chan & Makino, 2007). In order to control for the country risk 
that can influence the ownership decision (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Dutta, Malhotra, 
& Zhu, 2016), we include the GDP per capita growth provided by the WDI database as 
a measure of economic fluctuations, as well as the political stability provided by the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2018). Additionally, as the industry is 
more mature and the knowledge is widespread, MNEs have fewer incentives to acquire 
higher levels of ownership to protect innovations and specific assets than in early stages 
in the industry (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986). To control for the maturity of the industry 
in the host market, we include demand growth (Li & Li, 2010) and level of competition 
 
11 Connections are measured by the number of SIM cards registered in the network of the subsidiary at the 
end of each period (GSMA Intelligence, 2017).  
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by counting the number of firms present in each market at any given time (Gómez & 
Maícas, 2011; Gómez et al., 2016). We also control for the occurrence of a technological 
change in the market, because uncertainty increases when a shock occurs in the market. 
We understand that a technological change took place when 3G was introduced into the 
market, so the variable takes the value 0 before the introduction of 3G into the country 
and 1 thereafter. Finally, we proxy the level of regulatory restrictions on performing 
business in a country through one factor resulting from the three dimensions of the market 
openness category of the Index of Economic Freedom obtained from the Heritage 
Foundation (Cebula & Clark, 2012).12  
We also control for the distance between home and host market conditions through 
different variables. Firstly, we include the geographic distance between home and host 
countries. Distance increases firms’ perceived uncertainty, as well as the agency and 
transaction costs for the acquirer (Malhotra & Gaur, 2014). In line with prior studies 
(Malhotra & Gaur, 2014; Malhotra, Sivakumar, & Zhu, 2009; Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 
2010), we measure geographic distance, according to the Geobytes database, as the 
distance in kilometres between the capital cities of the acquiring and the target country. 
We also include geographic distance squared because the cost and benefit trade-off of 
full versus partial ownership varies at different levels of geographic distance (Malhotra 
& Gaur, 2014).  
Secondly, it has been shown that when the linguistic and religious distances 
between the acquirer’s home country and the target’s home country are higher, the 
acquirer will tend to seek a lower equity share in the target (Dow et al., 2016). 
Accordingly, we include linguistic distance and religious distance measures in the 
 
12 The Index of Economic Freedom focuses on four key aspects of the economic environment over which 
governments typically exercise policy control. This index is based on 12 quantitative and qualitative factors, 
grouped into four broad categories, or pillars, of economic freedom. One of these pillars is the open markets 
category that includes trade, investment and financial freedom. 
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analysis. Similar to previous studies (Dow et al., 2016), we use a composite index created 
by Dow and Karunaratna (2006) based on the distance between the main 
languages/religions of the two countries and the incidence of the main languages/religions 
of a country in another country (for more details, see Dow & Karunaratna, 2006; Dow et 
al., 2016).13 Thirdly, we include a measure of institutional distance (Ilhan-Nas et al., 2018; 
Xu, Pan, & Beamish, 2004). Following previous studies, we computed institutional 
distance as the absolute value of the difference between the Index of Economic Freedom 
of the home and the host countries (Jiang, Holburn, & Beamish, 2014). Finally, we 
include economic distance to control for differences between the GDP per capita in the 
home country of the MNE and the host country (Caves, 1996). 
Additionally, in the second stage model, we include a dummy variable to control 
for whether the MNE has a majority or minority initial ownership of the subsidiary. The 
incentives to increase the level of ownership may be different in the two cases. We can 
expect that once the MNE has reached a majority ownership—and control—in the initial 
acquisition, the incentives to increase the equity level will be lower than in cases where 
the MNE has entered through minority ownership and wishes to gain control. As the 
ownership variations will depend on the information and experience that the acquirer 
gains from the target firm after the initial entry (Petersen et al., 2000), we control the 
number of periods that have elapsed since the initial ownership acquisition through the 
variable post-acquisition time. As the last effect could be not linear, we include the second 
order variable post-acquisition time squared. Finally, we also include time and group 
effects, thus controlling for different business environments over time and groups. 
 
13 Data were obtained 18 December 2018 from https://sites.google.com/site/ddowresearch/ 
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4.6. Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the initial ownership and ownership variation stages are 
shown in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. As can be seen in Table 1, the average initial 
ownership for the 90 CBAs in our sample is 63.98 per cent, with a standard deviation of 
32.6 per cent, in line with previous studies (Chari & Chang, 2009; Malhotra & Gaur, 
2014). During the post-entry time, on average, there is a positive ownership variation of 
10.7 per cent, with values ranging between divestments of almost 20 per cent and 
increases of up to 78 per cent. Leading time from the entry of the pioneer ranges from 0 
(for market pioneers) to 88 quarters (for market followers). The average values of 
independent variables and control variables are similar in both stages.  
Correlations are shown in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 shows the correlations for the 
initial ownership model, while Table 4 shows the correlations in the ownership variation 
model. The level of ownership initially acquired by an MNE and the ownership variation 
are negatively correlated with the leading time from the entry of the pioneer in the market. 
The correlation between independent variables remains moderate in most cases. Before 
estimating the regression models, we carried out a test for potential multicollinearity and 
found that the variance inflation factor in our models in the two stages was below 10 (the 
maximum VIF is 7.76 in the initial ownership model and 6.98 in the ownership variation 
model), being the rule of thumb that suggests the presence of multicollinearity (Neter, 
Wasserman, & Kutner, 1990). Multicollinearity does not therefore pose a problem.  
------------------------------------------- 






5.1. Analysis of the effect of the leading time on the initial ownership acquired 
Table 5 provides the results of the Tobit regression for the first stage analysis 
(Models 1 to 5). Model 1 only considers the influence of the control variables in the initial 
ownership acquired by the MNE, while Model 2 introduces the effect of leading time 
(Hypothesis 1). Models 3 includes the interaction effect of market age on the main 
relationship (Hypothesis 3a), while Model 4 considers the interaction effect of new 
technology introduction (Hypothesis 4a). Finally, Model 5 is the full model that includes 
the two interaction terms. The likelihood ratio test shows that Model 4 is the model that 
best fits our data. That is why we employ it in interpreting the results of the main 
independent variables. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
-------------------------------- 
The effect of control variables on initial ownership remains quite stable in Models 
1 to 5. As can be observed, the level of ownership initially acquired in CBAs is higher in 
those countries with higher levels of GDP per capita, political stability, GDP per capita 
growth, demand growth and competition. The ownership initially acquired in the 
subsidiary is also higher when the acquirer has a greater size. However, the initial 
percentage acquired tends to be lower when greater institutional and economic distance 
exist, and when the target firm is smaller. However, other control variables, such as the 
international experience of the acquirer and the performance of the target firm, remain 
insignificant across the five models. 
Hypothesis 1 states that leading time negatively influences the percentage in the 
subsidiary that MNEs initially acquire. Our results in Model 4 show that the higher the 
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leading time between the entry of the pioneer and the entry of the subsidiary, the lower 
the percentage initially acquired (β=-2.564; p<0.01). This effect remains negative and 
significant in all models. As a consequence, Hypothesis 1, showing that MNEs tend 
initially to buy higher levels of equity in subsidiaries that have entered into the market 
earlier, is supported. 
With regard to the moderating effect of market age on the relationship between 
leading time and the level of ownership initially acquired, our results do not find support 
for Hypothesis 3a. As we can see in the likelihood ratio test, the introduction of the 
moderating effect in both Model 3 and Model 5 does not contribute to explain the initial 
ownership decision. Conversely, results from Model 4 support Hypothesis 4a, which 
states that the negative effect of leading time on the initial ownership acquired is 
positively moderated by the introduction of a new technology by the subsidiary. Our 
results show that the moderating effect between leading time and new technology 
introduction is positive and significant (β=3.084; p<0.05), confirming that the erosion of 
early-mover advantages makes late entrants more attractive under these circumstances at 
the time of the initial acquisition. A graphical illustration of this moderating effect is 
provided in Figure 1. We can observe a negative relationship between leading time and 
the ownership initially acquired (as stated by Hypothesis 1). However, the slope of this 
negative relationship is less pronounced for those subsidiaries that have been first to 
introduce a new technology into the market.14 As subsidiaries introduce technological 
changes, first-mover advantages are eroded and the leading time loses importance as the 
determinant of the ownership decision. 
 
14 Although Hypothesis 4a is supported, our result may (at least partially) also be due to boundary effects. 
As shown in Figure 1, when leading time is low, the initial ownership level for companies that introduce a 
new technology is much lower than for companies that do not do it, which may be a reason to observe a 




Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
5.2. Analysis of the effect of the leading time on the ownership variation 
Table 6 provides the results of the random-effects Tobit estimations for panel data 
for the ownership variation during the post-entry time (Models 6 to 10). Model 6 only 
includes control variables; Model 7 incorporates the effect of leading time (Hypothesis 
2); Model 8 considers the interaction between leading time and market age (Hypothesis 
3b); and Model 9 considers the interaction between leading time and new technology 
introduction (Hypothesis 4b). Model 10 is the full model, including the two interaction 
terms. The likelihood ratio test shows that Model 10 is the model that best fits our data. 
That is why we employ it in interpreting the results of the main independent variables. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Once MNEs have acquired an initial percentage in a subsidiary, they can change 
their levels of participation. Models 6 to 10 in Table 6 show that the effect of control 
variables on ownership variation is quite stable. The effect of the MNE’s international 
experience on the ownership variation is always positive and significant. The time elapsed 
after the acquisition has a positive and significant direct effect, and a negative and 
significant effect in the quadratic term. Thus, acquirers tend to acquire higher levels of 
ownership after the initial acquisition as they gain direct experience from the target firm, 
although they are less likely to increase the level of their ownership soon after the initial 
acquisition or when they have been established for a very long time. Similarly, the 
institutional distance has a negative and significant effect initially, but influences the 
ownership variation in a positive and significant way. Thus, once the acquirer has gained 
experience in the host country whose institutional conditions greatly differ from those of 
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its home country, it is more likely to increase its ownership of the subsidiary. Moreover, 
acquirers tend to acquire higher levels of ownership in the post-acquisition time when 
they initially entered with majority levels of ownership, as well as when the market is 
growing in terms of GDP per capita and demand. 
Hypothesis 2 posits that leading time is negatively related to variation in the 
percentage of ownership after the initial acquisition. As observed in Model 10, leading 
time presents the expected negative sign (β=-0.291; p<0.05). This means that, even after 
the initial acquisition, the leading time between the entry of the pioneer and the entry of 
the subsidiary influences the variation in MNEs’ participation in the target firm. However, 
this negative effect is only significant in those models that include the interaction with 
market age, partially supporting Hypothesis 2.  
Results from Model 10 also support Hypothesis 3b, which states that the negative 
effect of leading time on ownership variation is positively moderated by market age as a 
consequence of the erosion of early-mover advantages. Our results show that the 
interaction between leading time and market age is positive and significant (β=0.006; 
p<0.01), confirming that the erosion of early-mover advantages makes late entrants more 
attractive. A graphical illustration of this moderating effect is provided in Figure 2, where 
we can observe the negative relationship between the leading time between the entry of 
the pioneer and the subsidiary and ownership variation (Hypothesis 2). As shown in the 
figure, the negative relationship between leading time and ownership variation in younger 
markets becomes positive in more mature markets (Hypothesis 3b). This confirms that, 
in more incipient markets, the leading time acts a key signal of potential performance, 
which reduces uncertainty about potential performance and makes parent firms more 
willing to increase their ownership level in the subsidiary. However, as markets mature, 
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first-mover advantages are eroded and late-mover advantages can be even more important 
in the ownership variation decision.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Hypothesis 4b states that the introduction of a new technology by a subsidiary after 
the initial acquisition positively moderates the relationship between leading time and 
ownership variation. Results from Model 10 support Hypothesis 4b, showing a positive 
coefficient for the interaction between leading time and the introduction of a new 
technology in the post-acquisition time (β=0.242; p<0.01). We illustrate this moderation 
effect in Figure 3, which shows the negative relationship between leading time and the 
variation of ownership after the initial acquisition (Hypothesis 2). We observe that this 
negative relationship is weaker for subsidiaries that have been the first to introduce a new 
technology. Thus, as subsidiaries introduce new technologies that erode existing first-
mover advantages, the leading time loses importance as the determinant of the ownership 
decision. 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This research has analysed the effect of the entry timing of the target on the level 
of ownership acquired by an MNE when the latter carries out a CBA. The study is 
performed in two stages. We analysed the ownership acquired in the initial entry first, 
and then the variation in the level of ownership during the post-entry period. Drawing on 
information economics and transaction costs economics, we argue that CBAs entail a high 
degree of uncertainty that the acquiring firm should manage both in the initial moment of 
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acquisition and once the acquisition has happened. We claim that the entry timing of the 
target firm is an important predictor of this uncertainty, and that it helps to reduce 
information asymmetries between the acquirer and the target. Therefore, taking this 
information into account, the acquirer is in a better position to evaluate the assets and 
capabilities of the desired company and to make better investment decisions. Our findings 
show that, in contexts where first-mover advantages exist, MNEs acquire lower levels of 
ownership in targets that have entered into the market later. The greater the leading time 
between the entry of the pioneer and the entry of the target, the higher the uncertainty of 
the MNE, with a subsequent reduction in the level of ownership initially acquired.  
Additionally, our study incorporates a dynamic perspective into the analysis. After 
the initial acquisition, MNE’ perception of the potential of the target to generate value 
may change as a consequence of learning. As a result of information that is obtained 
directly from the firm, the acquirer is able to verify the existence of first-mover 
advantages and the potential of the target to generate future performance. Thus, the 
leading time will be a useful signal for acquirers to vary their levels of ownership. In fact, 
our results show that MNEs tend to increase their levels of ownership after their initial 
entry into subsidiaries that entered into the market earlier. As in the decision about initial 
ownership, a higher leading time is perceived as a negative signal that makes MNEs 
reluctant to increase their equity in subsidiaries.  
Nevertheless, this negative relationship between leading time and ownership is not 
independent of the circumstances, but is contingent on two important elements that can 
erode first-mover advantages: market age and the introduction of a new technology by 
the target company. Our logic is that the passage of time and the innovative character of 
the target company weaken the isolating mechanisms that protect first-mover advantages, 
reducing the importance of leading time as a signal to counteract uncertainty. Our findings 
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corroborate that the introduction of a new technology that erodes the existing first-mover 
advantages reduces the negative effect of leading time on the initial ownership acquired, 
as well as on the ownership variation during the post-entry time. The innovative character 
of the subsidiary sends a positive signal about its potential to generate value in the future 
that makes entry timing less relevant. However, an unexpected result that should be 
mentioned at this point is the negative (direct) effect that the introduction of a new 
technology has on the initial ownership acquired. Although our analysis confirms that the 
innovative nature of the target company erodes first-mover advantages, one would expect 
that the direct effect of the introduction of a new technology positively impacts the initial 
ownership acquired. New technologies may lead to obtaining higher levels of growth, 
with a subsequent increase in expected performance. So, the negative sign of this variable 
seems to be surprising. One possible explanation is that innovation and growth also entail 
additional risks. Innovative firms face challenges such as size, internal turmoil and higher 
resource needs (Hambrick & Crozier, 1985) that should be balanced with future expected 
performance. Regardless, this relationship does not seem to be clear and should receive 
further attention in future research. 
Furthermore, our findings show that market age also lowers the negative effect of 
leading time on the ownership variation, because late entrants are perceived as a less risky 
option when the market is more mature. However, market age does not have a significant 
effect as a moderator in the relationship between leading time and the level of initial 
ownership. A possible explanation can come from the fact that, when MNEs develop 
CBAs, they try to determine the scope of first-mover advantages based on the available 
information about the market and the target firm. Contrary to the case of the innovative 
character of the subsidiary, the effect of time on first-mover advantages erosion could be 
less perceptible to foreign investors since they do not possess a broad perspective of the 
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evolution of the scope of these advantages over time in the target market. After the initial 
acquisition, the MNE obtains direct and regular information on the market that helps the 
acquirer to verify not only the existence of first-mover advantages, but also their erosion 
as the market gets older. Consequently, market age may have a significant moderating 
effect on the relationship between leading time and ownership variation, but not on the 
relationship between leading time and the initial ownership. 
The main contribution of this research has been the integration of entry timing 
literature into analysis of the level of ownership in CBAs by examining how the entry 
timing influences the ownership strategy in CBAs. In this way, this study answers 
Zachary et al.’s (2015) call for the development of a more unifying framework of entry 
strategy that integrates entry timing with other important dimensions. Moreover, we focus 
on a target-level variable—namely, its leading time. Previous studies have tended to focus 
on country-level and MNE-level determinants of ownership. In a context where first-
mover advantages exist, the leading time between the entry of the pioneer and the entry 
of the target is confirmed to be a key determinant of the ownership decision in CBAs.  
Secondly, we incorporate a dynamic perspective into the analysis by considering 
that ownership can vary over time. This paper explores how the leading time influences 
not only the initial ownership acquired in CBAs, but also the ownership variation during 
the post-entry period. Finally, we analyse the effect of the erosion of first-mover 
advantages on prior relationships. In doing so, we consider how market age and the 
introduction of new technologies by the target erode first-mover advantages, making 
leading time a less important determinant of the ownership held by an MNE. 
Our study has some implications from a managerial point of view. Firstly, MNEs 
should take into account the importance of first-mover advantages enjoyed by the target 
company before deciding on the acquisition of a foreign subsidiary. When first-mover 
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advantages exist, the target firm is more attractive if it has entered into the market earlier; 
but this attractiveness is influenced by other variables, such as the stage of development 
of the market and the innovative character of the target firm. In mature markets, first-
mover advantages will be reduced, and investing in a late entrant will not be as risky. The 
subsidiary’s attractiveness will also be reduced if a late entrant shows an innovative 
profile. When the target firm introduces a key innovation—which may even replace the 
technology that originated the first-mover advantages—the entry timing of the subsidiary 
becomes less important in the ownership decision. Secondly, entering with lower levels 
of ownership allow MNEs to gain strategic flexibility in order to revise their risk position 
in the future and adjust the level of ownership held in the subsidiary. For this reason, it is 
very important that MNEs verify the existence of first-mover advantages after the 
acquisition of a new subsidiary to adapt the resource commitment to the expected 
profitability that comes from the existence of these advantages.  
Our study is not without limitations. Firstly, the empirical analysis focuses on a 
single industry. With this decision, we avoid the influence of industry-specific variables 
that previous studies have shown to influence ownership decisions, such as industry 
technological level or industry R&D level (Chari & Chang, 2009; Dow et al., 2016). 
Future studies should develop this analysis in other industries where first-mover 
advantages are important in order to corroborate and go deeper into the analysis of the 
effect of entry timing on equity ownership. Secondly, we focus on a context where first-
mover advantages have been demonstrated to outweigh first-mover disadvantages. It is 
possible that the same analysis in a context where there are late-mover advantages may 
report different results. Future research should explore this possibility. Thirdly, although 
we incorporate the yearly performance of the subsidiary as a control variable in the 
analysis, we should be conscious that when selecting the target firm, MNEs will use 
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additional information such as long-term profitability or brand strength, information that 
is not available for our research purposes. Finally, the study focuses on two factors—
market age and technological discontinuities—that weaken isolating mechanisms and 
thus erode first-mover advantages. Although their importance has been highlighted in 
prior studies, there are other factors that can make isolating mechanisms less effective, 
such as changes in consumer preferences and regulation. Future research should pay 
attention to these factors that may also influence the equity ownership decision.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the initial ownership model (N=90) 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Initial ownership 63.98 32.64 10.3 100 
Leading time 17.14 20.17 0 88 
Market age 49.59 18.56 18 89 
New technology introduction 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Subsidiary size 48.69 76.99 0.08 323.8 
Subsidiary performance 0.15 0.64 -3.43 0.81 
Prior presence 0.03 0.18 0 1 
International experience 14.06 9.64 1 43 
Parent size 81.99 100.2 0.07 480.1 
GDP per capita 21.69 25.65 0.55 111.9 
GDP per capita growth 2.96 3.33 -5.99 16.23 
Political stability -0.05 1.17 -2.30 1.52 
Demand growth 0.46 1.42 -0.13 13.57 
Competition 6.19 3.02 3 18 
Technological change 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Market openness 0.37 1.19 -2.90 2.11 
Geographic distance 0.39 0.38 0.02 1.70 
Geographic distance2 2.92 5.15 0.00 28.90 
Linguistic distance -0.78 1.51 -3.87 0.53 
Religious distance -0.31 0.97 -1.55 1.53 
Institutional distance 10.10 9.21 0.30 36.70 
Economic distance 22.82 20.45 0.12 95.90 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the ownership variation model (N=2231) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Ownership variation 10.73 18.09 -17.2 78.3 
Leading time 14.13 16.81 0 88 
Market age 66.71 18.98 19 118 
New technology introduction 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Subsidiary size 96.02 158.6 0.06 1,526 
Subsidiary performance 0.13 3.92 -105 0.94 
Prior presence 0.02 0.16 0 1 
International experience 19.53 12.62 1 49 
Parent size 169.6 162.0 0.18 655.7 
Majority ownership 0.83 0.37 0 1 
Post-acquisition time 24.09 14.69 2 64 
Post-acquisition time2 795.8 850.9 4 4,096 
GDP per capita 22.10 23.89 0 109.04 
GDP per capita growth 2.41 3.98 -29.89 24.67 
Political stability 0.02 1.01 -2.68 1.53 
Demand growth 0.16 0.25 -0.38 1.77 
Competition 6.25 3.03 3 18 
Technological change 0.84 0.37 0 1 
Market openness 0.50 1.12 -2.91 2.23 
Geographic distance 0.36 0.41 0.02 1.88 
Geographic distance2 2.96 6.68 0.00 35.48 
Linguistic distance -0.92 1.58 -3.87 0.53 
Religious distance -0.50 0.88 -1.55 1.53 
Institutional distance 8.86 8.00 0 36.80 




Table 3. Correlations for the initial ownership model (N=90)   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
1 Initial ownership 1.00  
                     
2 Leading time -0.16 1.00  
                    
3 Market age -0.07 0.62* 1.00  
                   
4 New technology introduction -0.31* 0.02 0.11 1.00  
                  
5 Subsidiary size -0.21* -0.10 0.38* -0.04 1.00  
                 
6 Subsidiary performance 0.17 -0.63* -0.23* 0.01 0.20* 1.00  
                
7 Prior presence -0.00 -0.05 0.13 -0.06 0.34* 0.11 1.00  
               
8 International experience -0.07 -0.21* 0.13 0.10 0.33* -0.01 0.10  1.00  
              
9 Parent size 0.02 -0.15 0.28* 0.22* 0.30* 0.12 0.05  0.59* 1.00  
             
10 GDP per capita 0.20* 0.09 0.06 0.25* -0.15 -0.03 -0.05  -0.04 -0.02 1.00  
            
11 GDP per capita growth 0.05 -0.15 -0.04 0.09 -0.02 0.12 0.00  -0.04 -0.10 -0.42* 1.00  
           
12 Political stability 0.21* -0.07 -0.16 0.24* -0.20* 0.01 -0.08  -0.08 -0.01 0.65* -0.27* 1.00  
          
13 Demand growth -0.12 -0.10 -0.13 -0.09 -0.08 0.04 -0.04  0.05 -0.01 -0.18* -0.02 -0.21* 1.00  
         
14 Competition 0.10 0.09 0.15 -0.15 0.15 -0.03 0.32* -0.21* -0.13 -0.28* 0.24* -0.33* -0.04 1.00  
        
15 Technological change -0.10 0.36* 0.60* 0.32* 0.36* -0.17 0.07  0.21* 0.37* 0.16 -0.15 0.05 -0.20* 0.08  1.00  
       
16 Market openness 0.13 0.00 -0.01 0.28* -0.09 -0.01 -0.02  0.08 0.07 0.67* -0.48* 0.75* -0.16 -0.38* 0.10 1.00  
      
17 Geographic distance -0.29* -0.11 -0.06 0.33* 0.01 -0.05 -0.16  0.22* 0.29* -0.12 -0.07 -0.01 0.09 -0.10  -0.05 0.06 1.00  
     
18 Geographic distance2 -0.22* -0.10 -0.01 0.41* -0.02 -0.04 -0.10  0.23* 0.41* 0.06 -0.15 0.14 0.02 -0.11  0.00 0.20* 0.93* 1.00  
    
19 Linguistic distance -0.19* -0.03 -0.01 -0.14 0.25* -0.04 -0.01  0.04 -0.10 -0.10 -0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.00  0.12 -0.09 -0.21* -0.30* 1.00  
   
20 Religious distance -0.37* -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 0.09 -0.06 0.04  0.05 0.13 -0.34* 0.15 -0.29* 0.03 0.01  0.04 -0.35* 0.16 -0.02 0.31* 1.00  
  
21 Institutional distance -0.40* 0.16 0.18* 0.12 0.01 -0.25* 0.12  0.05 -0.12 -0.18* 0.26* -0.21* 0.13 0.14  0.13 -0.16 0.08 -0.02 0.33* 0.43* 1.00  
 






Tables 4. Correlations for the ownership variation model (N=2231)   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
1 Ownership variation 1.00  
                        
2 Leading time -0.03* 1.00  
                       
3 Market age 0.04* 0.45* 1.00  
                      
4 New technology 
introduction 
0.06* -0.01 0.17* 1.00 
                     
5 Subsidiary size 0.18* -0.02* 0.13* 0.01 1.00  
                    
6 Subsidiary performance 0.02 -0.11* 0.01 0.02 0.02* 1.00  
                   
7 Prior presence -0.05* 0.00 0.08* -0.06* 0.09* 0.01 1.00  
                  
8 International 
experience 
0.03* -0.12* 0.24* 0.11* 0.16* 0.04* 0.00  1.00 
                 
9 Parent size 0.06* -0.11* 0.33* 0.25* 0.23* 0.03* 0.01  0.65* 1.00  
                
10 Majority ownership 0.18* -0.01 0.10* -0.02* -0.12* -0.03 0.02  0.13* 0.05* 1.00  
               
11 Post-acquisition time 0.27* -0.11* 0.46* 0.24* 0.09* 0.05* -0.11* 0.22* 0.35* 0.14* 1.00  
              
12 Post-acquisition time2 0.26* -0.10* 0.48* 0.22* 0.05* 0.02* -0.09* 0.21* 0.21* 0.13* 0.95* 1.00  
             
13 GDP per capita -0.02 0.11* 0.06* 0.04* 0.01 0.00 0.03* 0.14* 0.05* 0.08* 0.05* 0.09* 1.00  
            
14 GDP per capita growth 0.02 -0.06* -0.03* -0.01 -0.03* -0.01 -0.01  -0.07* -0.06* -0.09* -0.10* -0.05* -0.11* 1.00  
           
15 Political stability 0.00 -0.01 0.03* 0.10* -0.05* 0.02* 0.01  0.01* -0.00 0.12* 0.08* 0.09* 0.63* 0.04* 1.00 
          
16 Demand growth -0.09* -0.09* -0.15* -0.16* -0.05* -0.01 -0.03* -0.13* -0.13* -0.14* -0.32* -0.10* -0.17* 0.09* -0.15* 1.00  
         
17 Competition -0.00 0.11* -0.04* -0.14* 0.03* -0.04* 0.14* -0.05* 0.03* -0.02* -0.06* -0.05* -0.12* 0.08* -0.25* 0.04* 1.00  
        
18 Technological change 0.06* 0.12* 0.45* 0.30* 0.31* -0.01 0.06* 0.31* 0.38* 0.10* 0.42* 0.29* 0.24* -0.12* 0.16* -0.31* 0.12* 1.00  
       
19 Market openness 0.08* 0.05* 0.12* 0.17* -0.05* 0.02* -0.04* 0.16* 0.07* 0.15* 0.17* 0.16* 0.62* -0.10* 0.60* -0.17* -0.18* 0.26* 1.00  
      
20 Geographic distance -0.13* -0.07* -0.10* 0.04* 0.03* -0.00 -0.09* 0.14* 0.18* -0.06* -0.08* -0.10* -0.15* -0.02* -0.06* 0.01* -0.12* -0.07* -0.06* 1.00  
     
21 Geographic distance2 -0.11* -0.04* -0.07* 0.03* 0.02* -0.00 -0.06* 0.13* 0.18* -0.04* -0.02* -0.04* 0.01 -0.02* 0.07* -0.01 -0.11* -0.00 0.06* 0.93* 1.00  
    
22 Linguistic distance 0.12* -0.07* -0.09* -0.07* 0.10* 0.00 0.01  0.07* -0.06* -0.14* -0.09* -0.09* -0.09* 0.08* -0.08* -0.01 -0.06* 0.00 -0.08* -0.03* -0.13* 1.00 
   
23 Religious distance -0.11* -0.06* -0.09* -0.12* 0.12*  0.02* 0.06* -0.01 0.14* -0.24* -0.19* -0.15* -0.36* 0.13* -0.33* 0.08* 0.06* -0.10* -0.41* 0.28* 0.12* 0.38* 1.00 
  
24 Institutional distance 0.03* -0.01 -0.05* -0.05* 0.07* 0.00 0.01  0.11* 0.25* -0.23* -0.03* -0.08* -0.18* 0.01* -0.25* 0.09* 0.03* -0.08* -0.29* 0.29* 0.21* 0.09* 0.24* 1.00 
 




Table 5. Results for determinants of initial ownership 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
Leading time  -1.569*** -1.865** -2.564*** -3.045*** 
  (0.330) (0.715) (0.582) (0.917) 
Leading time x Market age   0.006  0.009 
   (0.012)  (0.013) 
Leading time x New technology 
introduction 
   3.084** 3.127** 
    (1.221) (1.209) 
Market age 0.738** 1.853*** 1.736*** 2.617*** 2.413*** 
 (0.344) (0.428) (0.476) (0.682) (0.731) 
New technology introduction -100.9*** -83.53*** -79.73*** -131.8*** -126.4*** 
 (18.54) (16.04) (17.77) (32.03) (32.31) 
Subsidiary size -0.242*** -0.350*** -0.342*** -0.399*** -0.393*** 
 (0.089) (0.082) (0.083) (0.098) (0.098) 
Subsidiary performance 12.44 -10.98 -9.958 -13.99 -13.18 
 (6.982) (7.820) (8.100) (7.793) (7.900) 
Prior presence -26.76 -11.74 -10.59 -34.98* -32.01 
 (21.02) (18.06) (18.13) (20.01) (20.27) 
International experience 1.460 -0.059 -0.037 0.667 0.659 
 (1.263) (1.073) (1.071) (1.109) (1.100) 
Parent size 0.438*** 0.371*** 0.392*** 0.216* 0.254* 
 (0.138) (0.118) (0.126) (0.122) (0.133) 
GDP per capita 0.736** 0.660** 0.681** 0.154* 0.192 
 (0.312) (0.278) (0.280) (0.300) (0.302) 
GDP per capita growth 10.533*** 8.173*** 8.012*** 11.615*** 11.293*** 
 (2.661) (2.336) (2.344) (3.159) (3.128) 
Political stability 11.30* 12.15** 11.70** 19.56** 18.14** 
 (6.298) (5.377) (5.389) (7.512) (7.717) 
Demand growth 6.123** 4.144* 4.178* 8.846** 8.757** 
 (2.826) (2.401) (2.389) (3.505) (3.455) 
Competition 5.666*** 3.847** 3.799** 3.502** 3.381* 
 (1.967) (1.641) (1.626) (1.719) (1.713) 
Technological change 21.62 24.63** 21.91 55.94*** 51.94** 
 (13.63) (11.90) (13.19) (19.50) (19.96) 
Market openness -6.073 -2.792 -3.072 -1.750 -2.320 
 (6.385) (5.433) (5.456) (6.681) (6.801) 
Geographic distance 13.46 61.73 57.58 -118.3 -122.3 
 (49.41) (44.47) (45.24) (77.18) (76.59) 
Geographic distance2 -4.953 -7.640 -7.514 6.389 6.432 
 (3.819) (3.409) (3.412) (5.765) (5.701) 
Linguistic distance 4.066 5.778 5.588 16.55** 16.34** 
 (4.400) (3.723) (3.713) (7.635) (7.527) 
Religious distance -4.332 -9.806 -9.277 -3.331 -2.969 
 (6.972) (6.065) (6.154) (6.583) (6.585) 
Institutional distance -2.659*** -2.847*** -2.814*** -4.223*** -4.223*** 
 (0.669) (0.585) (0.588) (1.112) (1.095) 
Economic distance -1.073** -0.678* -0.653 -1.454** -1.405** 
 (0.471) (0.410) (0.411) (0.661) (0.652) 
Dummy group Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
_cons -8.400 -10.407 -1.238 57.015 73.179* 
 (28.083) (24.611) (30.983) (34.030) (40.957) 
sigma      
_cons 20.676*** 17.752*** 17.699*** 16.558*** 16.485*** 
 (2.002) (1.700) (1.697) (1.581) (1.574) 
N 90 90 90 90 90 
LL ratio test versus Model 1  22.19*** 22.41*** 33.16*** 33.65*** 
LL ratio test versus Model 2   0.22 10.97*** 11.46*** 
LL ratio test versus Model 3     11.24*** 
LL ratio test versus Model 4     0.49 




Table 6. Results for determinants of ownership variation 
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
      
Leading time  0.184 -0.315** 0.135 -0.291** 
  (0.119) (0.138) (0.118) (0.137) 
Leading time x Market age   0.007***  0.006*** 
   (0.001)  (0.001) 
Leading time x New technology introduction    0.331*** 0.242*** 
    (0.063) (0.064) 
Market age 0.115* 0.078 0.100 0.074 0.094 
 (0.067) (0.071) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) 
New technology introduction -1.509* -1.441 -1.425 1.603 0.801 
 (0.881) (0.882) (0.872) (1.052) (1.051) 
Subsidiary size 0.002 0.002 -0.004** 0.002 -0.004* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Subsidiary performance 0.117 0.159 0.150 0.150 0.145 
 (0.123) (0.124) (0.125) (0.123) (0.124) 
Prior presence -8.839 -8.047 -5.482 -9.328 -6.694 
 (9.155) (8.968) (9.087) (8.888) (8.978) 
International experience 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.152*** 0.187*** 0.180*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) 
Parent size -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Majority ownership 20.28*** 20.26*** 20.21*** 20.44*** 20.33*** 
 (1.152) (1.151) (1.140) (1.142) (1.135) 
Post-acquisition time 0.512*** 0.570*** 0.499*** 0.563*** 0.503*** 
 (0.103) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) 
Post-acquisition time2 -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDP per capita -0.143** -0.142** -0.146** -0.151** -0.152** 
 (0.071) (0.070) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) 
GDP per capita growth 0.116*** 0.115*** 0.099** 0.098** 0.089** 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Political stability 0.215 0.207 -0.132 0.118 -0.155 
 (0.522) (0.521) (0.517) (0.518) (0.515) 
Demand growth 2.953*** 2.931*** 1.949** 2.679*** 1.880** 
 (0.933) (0.933) (0.931) (0.929) (0.929) 
Competition -0.208 -0.036 -0.123 0.072 -0.033 
 (0.569) (0.567) (0.574) (0.562) (0.568) 
Technological change 1.353* 1.327* 1.467** 1.030 1.232* 
 (0.698) (0.698) (0.690) (0.696) (0.691) 
Market openness 0.123 0.189 0.415 0.222 0.416 
 (0.571) (0.572) (0.567) (0.568) (0.565) 
Geographic distance 4.361 5.056 9.085 -1.055 4.146 
 (15.79) (15.44) (15.64) (15.35) (15.50) 
Geographic distance2 -0.862 -0.958 -1.176 -0.612 -0.898 
 (0.957) (0.938) (0.950) (0.931) (0.941) 
Linguistic distance 0.983 0.775 0.587 1.012 0.781 
 (1.495) (1.468) (1.487) (1.455) (1.469) 
Religious distance -2.106 -1.626 -1.264 -0.780 -0.683 
 (2.870) (2.822) (2.859) (2.800) (2.827) 
Institutional distance 0.361*** 0.366*** 0.247*** 0.343*** 0.245*** 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.066) (0.064) (0.066) 
Economic distance 0.009 0.009 0.015 0.011 0.016 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Dummy year Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Dummy group Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
_cons -24.678** -30.483*** -23.209** -28.655*** -22.753** 
 (9.677) (10.22) (10.33) (10.14) (10.23) 
sigma_u (_cons) 12.696*** 12.398*** 12.572*** 12.281*** 12.407*** 
 (0.989) (0.981) (0.995) (0.970) (0.981) 
sigma_e (_cons) 5.396*** 5.398*** 5.330*** 5.366*** 5.316*** 
 (0.083) (0.083) (0.082) (0.082) (0.081) 
N 2231 2231 2231 2231 2231 
LL ratio test versus Model 6  2.33 54.23*** 29.54*** 68.30*** 
LL ratio test versus Model 7   51.90*** 27.21*** 65.97*** 
LL ratio test versus Model 8     14.07*** 
LL ratio test versus Model 9     38.76*** 




Figure 1. Initial ownership: Interaction between leading time and new technology introduction 
 
Figure 2. Post-entry time: Interaction between leading time and market age 
 



































































APPENDIX. HOST AND HOME COUNTRIES INCLUDED 
Host Countries (50 countries) 
Australia Egypt Kazakhstan Nigeria Switzerland 
Bangladesh Estonia Kenya Norway Turkey 
Belgium Greece Korea, South Poland Uganda 
Bulgaria Hong Kong Laos Saudi Arabia Ukraine 
Chile Indonesia Latvia Serbia United Kingdom 
Colombia Iran Luxembourg Singapore Uruguay 
Congo, Democratic 
Republic Ireland Malta Slovenia Uzbekistan 
Croatia Italy Morocco Spain Venezuela 
Côte d'Ivoire Japan Nepal Sri Lanka Yemen 
Denmark Jordan New Zealand Sweden Zambia 
 
Home Countries (24 countries) 
Australia India Saudi Arabia 
Austria Italy Singapore 
Belgium Japan South Africa 
Denmark Kuwait Spain 
Egypt Malaysia Sweden 
France Norway USA 
Germany Qatar United Arab Emirates 
Hong Kong Russian Federation United Kingdom 
 
 
 
